How Scientists View Causality and Assess Evidence:  A Study of the Institute of Medicine\u27s Evaluation of Health Effects in Vietnam Veterans and Agent Orange by Hertz-Picciotto, Irva
Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 13
Issue 2
SCIENCE FOR JUDGES IV:
Agent Orange Revisited and Human Behavior
Research
Article 4
2005
How Scientists View Causality and Assess
Evidence: A Study of the Institute of Medicine's
Evaluation of Health Effects in Vietnam Veterans
and Agent Orange
Irva Hertz-Picciotto
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Irva Hertz-Picciotto, How Scientists View Causality and Assess Evidence: A Study of the Institute of Medicine's Evaluation of Health Effects in
Vietnam Veterans and Agent Orange, 13 J. L. & Pol'y (2005).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol13/iss2/4
20313_blp_13-2 Sheet No. 31 Side A      06/23/2005   10:19:08
20313_blp_13-2 Sheet No. 31 Side A      06/23/2005   10:19:08
C M
Y K
HERTZ MACROED 051905.DOC 5/23/2005 7:48 PM
553
HOW SCIENTISTS VIEW CAUSALITY AND 
ASSESS EVIDENCE: A STUDY OF THE 
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE’S EVALUATION 
OF HEALTH EFFECTS IN VIETNAM 
VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE 
Irva Hertz-Picciotto, Ph.D., M.P.H.
INTRODUCTION
The courts are often called upon to settle disputes in which 
health damages are alleged to have been caused by environmental 
exposures to chemical, physical, or biologic agents. Similarly, 
health scientists are often called upon to assess evidence regarding 
diseases or developmental injuries that might be regarded as 
resulting from specific exposures. The overarching purpose of this 
paper is to familiarize readers with the way in which scientists 
assess data and view evidence about causality, using the example 
of herbicide and related exposures incurred by U.S. military 
personnel during service in Vietnam. 
One mechanism by which governmental or regulatory agencies 
at the international, national, or regional levels seek advice from 
scientists is by convening expert panels. These panels or advisory 
boards may be assembled as part of an ongoing program that 
reviews the state of the scientific literature on a topic or in 
response to specific needs. For example, panels may be assembled 
to help formulate a regulatory standard for a chemical in drinking 
water, ambient air, or the workplace environment. Thus, the 
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documents produced by expert committees may become the 
foundation for the development of health-related policies. 
The Institute of Medicine Committee to Review the Health 
Effects in Vietnam Veterans of Exposure to Herbicides (“IOM 
Committee” or “Committee”) is one such panel. This Committee 
was formed under the mandate of Public Law 102-4 (better known 
as the Agent Orange Act)1 to provide reports on a biannual basis to 
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), beginning in 1994. 
These reports were concerned with the potential adverse effects 
that might have been experienced by those who served in Vietnam 
because of exposures to herbicides, particularly the mixture 
dubbed Agent Orange, or contaminants found in this mixture, 
including the well-known chemical compound commonly referred 
to as “dioxin.” 
Part I of this article introduces the charge to the Committee, the 
process the Committee followed in order to reach conclusions 
about the evidence, the types of studies it considered, and the 
evidentiary categories it established for classifying specific health 
outcomes. Part II provides context for the decisions of the IOM 
Committee through a discussion of the principles that guided the 
Committee’s evaluative process and a presentation of the scientific 
concepts that constitute the foundation for inferences about 
causation in biomedical research. Part III explains the approach 
used by scientists, specifically, epidemiologists, for conducting 
studies in populations, estimating causal effects, and examining 
hypotheses. It also focuses more concretely on the obstacles to 
inferences about causation, specifically, imprecision, which is the 
uncertainty that arises from studying small samples, and bias, 
which is the uncertainty that derives from imperfections in study 
methodology. Part IV narrows this discussion to a description of 
the major types of bias—confounding, information, selection, and 
statistical bias. 
In contrast to the preceding sections, which focus on individual 
epidemiologic studies, Part V delineates the process by which 
scientists reach consensus and presents the framework commonly 
                                                          
1 Agent Orange Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-4, 105 Stat. 11 (codified as 
amended at 38 U.S.C. § 1116) [hereinafter Agent Orange Act]. 
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used in weighing a body of evidence involving sometimes dozens 
of studies. Part VI returns to the work of the IOM Committee and 
provides a detailed discussion of the evidence the Committee 
reviewed regarding the four outcomes mentioned above, taking 
into consideration the concepts presented in Parts III through V. 
I. VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE: THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE 
COMMITTEE
A. Charge to the Committee 
In light of growing concern about the health of Vietnam 
veterans, Congress enacted Public Law 102-4, the Agent Orange 
Act of 1991.2 Through this Act, Congress directed the Secretary of 
Veterans Affairs to request from the National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS) a comprehensive evaluation of the potential health 
effects from exposure to Agent Orange, a chemical compound used 
as a defoliant by the U.S. military during the Vietnam War.3 This 
legislation also called for reviews of newly available information 
on a biannual basis for a period of ten years.4 The Institute of 
Medicine (IOM) of the NAS convened a Committee to carry out 
this work. The charge to the Committee was to determine “to the 
extent that available scientific data permit meaningful 
determinations” the answers to three questions regarding specific 
health outcomes and their relationships to Agent Orange 
exposure.5 The first was “whether a statistical association with 
herbicide exposure exists, taking into account the strength of the 
scientific evidence and the appropriateness of the statistical and 
                                                          
2 Id.
3 Id. §§ 2-3. 
4 Id. § 3(g)(1) (requiring that a report be submitted to the Secretary of 
Veteran Affairs “at least once every two years”). 
5 Id. § 3(d)(1). See also COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE HEALTH EFFECTS IN 
VIETNAM VETERANS OF EXPOSURE TO HERBICIDES, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF 
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE: HEALTH EFFECTS 
OF HERBICIDES USED IN VIETNAM 221 (1994) [hereinafter VAO 1994]. 
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epidemiologic methods used to detect the association.”6 The 
Committee also was charged with determining “the increased risk 
of the disease among those exposed to herbicides during service in 
the Republic of Vietnam and during the Vietnam era.”7 Further, the 
Committee was asked to assess “whether there exists a plausible 
biologic mechanism or other evidence of a causal relationship 
between herbicide exposure and the disease” in question.8 Finally, 
Congress charged the Committee with making recommendations 
                                                          
6 Agent Orange Act § 3(d)(1)(A); see also VAO 1994, supra note 5, at 221. 
7 Agent Orange Act § 3(d)(1)(B); see also VAO 1994, supra note 5, at 221 
(stating “the increased risk of each disease in question among those exposed to 
herbicides during Vietnam service”). 
8 Agent Orange Act § 3(d)(1)(C); see also VAO 1994, supra note 5, at 221. 
Some authors have argued that the first charge does not mandate the 
Committee’s examination of “cause” or “causal association,” but instead 
requires only that the Committee look into a possible “statistical association.” 
However, the third question indeed requests that the Committee evaluate the 
existence of “evidence of a causal relationship.” Notably, any determination 
about the existence of “statistical association” that takes into account “strength” 
of the evidence and “appropriateness” of the methods examines the same 
concerns that enter into a consideration of evidence for causation. These 
concerns (for example, the strength of the association and the methods used) 
give rise to issues such as bias and confounding, which are defined in detail in 
Parts II through IV. Thus, although the Committee was not charged with 
drawing a conclusion about causation, the combination of responses to questions 
one and three effectively results in a lengthy consideration of virtually all of the 
issues that would be discussed if such a conclusion were required. As stated in a 
recent update issued by the 2002 Committee: 
The evaluation of evidence to reach conclusions about statistical 
associations goes beyond quantitative procedures at several stages: 
assessing the relevance and validity of individual reports; deciding on 
the possible influence of error, bias, confounding, or chance on the 
reported results; integrating the overall evidence within and between 
diverse fields of research; and formulating the conclusions themselves. 
Those aspects of the committee’s review required thoughtful 
consideration of alternative approaches at several points and could not 
be accomplished by adherence to a narrowly prescribed formula. 
COMM. TO REVIEW THE HEALTH EFFECTS IN VIETNAM VETERANS OF EXPOSURE 
TO HERBICIDES, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES,
VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE: UPDATE 2002 28 (2003) [hereinafter VAO
UPDATE 2002].
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for areas in which further study might help answer the questions of 
concern.9
Faced with the above mandates, the Committee first clarified 
the exposures to be evaluated. The Committee focused specifically 
on exposure to Agent Orange. Agent Orange and the other 
defoliants used in Vietnam were comprised of combinations of one 
or more of four herbicides: 2,4-D (dichlorophenoxyacetic acid), 
2,4,5-T (trichlorophenoxyacetic acid), 4-amino-3,5,6-
trichloropiclorinic acid (picloram), and dimethylarsenic acid 
(DMA or cacodylic acid). Mixtures containing 2,4-D or 2,4,5-T 
were contaminated by chemicals formed during the production 
process, including 2,3,7,8-trichlorodibenzodioxin (2,3,7,8-TCDD). 
Although other dioxins and dibenzofurans were also formed, 
2,3,7,8-TCDD is considered the most toxic and, as such, was the 
compound reviewed most extensively by the Committee. 
In the course of examining the effects of Agent Orange 
exposure, the Committee never evaluated the claim of any 
individual veteran, as this was not its charge. Indeed, the Agent 
Orange Act specified that such decisions would be made by the 
VA. Moreover, the Committee was instructed not to consider the 
issue of potential compensation in its deliberations. 
Before beginning its work, the members of the Committee 
were required to disclose potential conflicts of interest or biases, or 
anything that might create the appearance of a conflict of interest. 
These included financial holdings, consulting activities, 
government service, areas of research, and professional affiliations 
as well as any public statements or intellectual positions relevant to 
the topic of the Committee. Committee members served without 
                                                          
9 Agent Orange Act § 3(e) (directing the National Academy of Sciences to 
“make any recommendations it has for additional scientific studies to resolve 
areas of continuing scientific uncertainty relating to herbicide exposure”); see 
also VAO 1994, supra note 5, at 15. One of these recommendations was to 
commission an historical exposure reconstruction. Id. at 17-18. This 
recommendation led to the studies of Agent Orange exposure in Vietnam 
described by Dr. Jean Mager Stellman in this issue. See Jeanne Mager Stellman 
& Steven D. Stellman, Characterization of Exposure to Agent Orange in 
Vietnam Veterans As a Basis for Epidemiological Studies, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 505
(2005).
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compensation, except for reimbursement of expenses. 
Because the scope of the review is broad, the Committee 
includes health scientists representing expertise in a wide range of 
fields covering epidemiology, oncology, neurology, reproductive 
health, and toxicology. The IOM staff assists with the review, 
conducting library searches that begin with hundreds, if not a few 
thousand, of articles, and works with the Committee to 
progressively narrow them down to those articles that are pertinent 
to the questions at hand. 
B. Types of Evidence Reviewed 
For the scientists on the Committee, it was obvious that any 
findings of health effects from these same exposures could serve as 
evidence for potential effects in the Vietnam veterans, even if the 
results were obtained in other populations. Scientists consider 
biological systems in human beings to be sufficiently similar 
throughout the world that a high proportion of research findings, 
especially those that have been replicated in several studies, can be 
“generalized” to much larger populations beyond those that were 
studied. Because few studies actually were conducted on Vietnam 
veterans, other data sources were frequently used as the basis for 
the Committee’s decisions regarding the first and third questions 
posed to it by the Act. 
The three main sources of epidemiologic data used to address 
the first question were studies conducted in: (a) occupational 
groups with exposures in the workplace, such as chemical 
manufacturing, farming, application of herbicides, or paper and 
pulp manufacturing (where 2,3,7,8-TCDD is produced as a by-
product of the bleaching process);10 (b) populations with 
environmental exposures, which typically result from accidents 
that contaminate residential or recreational areas,11 or alternatively, 
from residence in agricultural regions in which herbicides are 
                                                          
10 2,3,7,8-TCDD is produced as a by-product of the bleaching process 
11 Such an event occurred in Seveso, Italy, when an explosion at a chemical 
plant caused 2,3,7,8-TCDD to contaminate a wide residential area. See Pier 
Alberto Bertazzi et al., Health Effects of Dioxin Exposure: A 20-year Mortality 
Study, 153 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1031 (2001). 
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widely used; and (c) veterans who served in Vietnam, including 
not only the U.S. armed forces, but also those from Australia. 
Although hundreds of studies have been reviewed each time 
the Committee has been convened (every two years), there are 
some cohorts of exposed persons that have played a prominent role 
in the deliberations. These cohorts had high exposures and were 
evaluated numerous times, often for different health outcomes 
(such as cancer, heart disease, diabetes, neurologic disorders, 
immune function and allergies, reproductive events, etc.), each 
time contributing more information to our knowledge base. Some 
of the most important of these were the National Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) cohort of workers 
employed after 1942 at twelve plants that manufactured chemicals 
containing 2,3,7,8-TCDD;12 a similar multinational cohort from 
more than half a dozen European countries, assembled by the 
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC);13 the cohort 
exposed to the explosion of a chemical plant in Seveso, Italy, in 
1976 that released 2,3,7,8-TCDD over an area populated by more 
than 200,000 persons;14 and the Air Force Health Study (AFHS), 
also known as the “Ranch Hand” study, of U.S. Air Force 
personnel responsible for flying spraying missions to defoliate 
North Vietnam using Agent Orange (these missions were termed 
“Operation Ranch Hand”).15
Each of these cohorts was characterized by higher than usual 
exposures. For instance, in the two occupational cohorts, a subset 
of the workers had experienced chloracne, an acute reaction of skin 
                                                          
12 See, e.g., Marilyn A. Fingerhut et al., Cancer Mortality in Workers 
Exposed to 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 212, 
212 (1991); Kyle Steenland et al., Cancer, Heart Disease, and Diabetes in 
Workers Exposed to 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin. 91 J. NAT’L CANCER
INST. 779 (1999). 
13 Manolis Kogevinas et al., Cancer Mortality in Workers Exposed to 
Phenoxy Herbicides, Chlorophenols, and Dioxins: An Expanded and Updated 
International Cohort Study, 145 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1061, 1061(1997). 
14 See Bertazzi, supra note 11. 
15 SCI. APPLICATIONS INT’L CORP., AIR FORCE HEALTH STUDY, AN
EPIDEMIOLOGIC INVESTIGATION OF HEALTH EFFECTS IN AIR FORCE PERSONNEL 
FOLLOWING EXPOSURE TO HERBICIDES (1997), FOLLOW-UP EXAMINATION 
RESULTS (2000). 
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eruptions that follows high exposures to 2,3,7,8-TCDD. In addition 
to the examination of multiple health endpoints, numerous subsets 
of the cohorts also were examined more extensively. Furthermore, 
in each of these four cohorts exposure was, at some point, 
measured in blood drawn from a subset of participants. 
The Ranch Hand study was the most extensive study of 
veterans. The Air Force initiated this cohort study, which 
attempted to recruit about 1,200 servicemen who were identified as 
Ranch Hand personnel and 1,700 Air Force personnel who were 
assigned to duty in Southeast Asia, but were not exposed 
occupationally to herbicides. In 1982, a baseline examination was 
conducted of both groups of men, and follow-up took place every 
five years thereafter. 
The Committee also held public hearings and invited written 
submissions. These provided the Committee members with an 
opportunity to hear from those most familiar with the conditions 
and sequelae of service in Vietnam, as well as the authors of 
relevant papers, including some that were in press, but not yet 
published.
C. The Process 
To provide a framework for its decisions, the initial committee, 
which began meeting in 1992, defined four categories of 
evidence.16 The first category consists of those health outcomes for 
which the available data provide sufficient evidence of an 
association.17 This category applies when multiple studies are 
consistent in showing an association, and bias, confounding, or 
random variation are not likely to explain the findings. The second 
category consists of those health outcomes for which the available 
research provides limited or suggestive evidence of an 
association.18 This category may apply when multiple studies 
observe an association, but the magnitude is sufficiently small that 
bias, confounding, or random variation cannot be ruled out. 
                                                          
16 See VAO 1994, supra note 5, at 246. 
17 Id.
18 Id. at 247. 
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Alternatively, there may be one or more reasonably high quality 
studies showing an association that other studies do not confirm. 
The third category is used to identify those health outcomes for 
which the literature provides inadequate or insufficient evidence
from which to determine whether an association exists.19 This 
category is used when there are very few studies, none of which is 
definitive, or where there are many studies, but the quality is 
inadequate (the studies might have failed to control confounding) 
or the findings are inconsistent. Finally, the last category is used to 
designate those health outcomes for which the extant research 
provides limited or suggestive evidence of no association.20 This 
category is used when there are numerous studies of reasonably 
high quality, and they consistently show no association between 
the exposure and the outcome.
The above categories were applied to the first question with 
which Congress charged the Committee. With regard to the second 
question, the paucity of data on those who served in Vietnam 
precluded, for the most part, making a determination about the 
magnitude of increased risk. First, the inability to assign exposures 
to individual veterans, including the vast majority of those who 
participated in the research studies that were conducted, was seen 
as an enormous obstacle. When an agent induces a response, it is 
recognized that the magnitude of the response, or the likelihood of 
developing a disease, tends to increase as the exposure gets larger. 
This phenomenon is referred to as “dose-response.” The 
Committee concluded that, without knowledge of the exposure 
level, the size of the risk could not be quantified. Even if an 
average exposure level were known, it would still be difficult to 
estimate an average risk because the existing research, whether in 
veterans, exposed workers, or accidentally-exposed populations, 
usually could not establish, that is, did not quantify, the dose-
response relationship. Given the lack of information about how 
steeply the risk for each of the health outcomes evaluated would be 
expected to rise, the Committee concluded that it was unable to 
answer the second question regarding the “increased risk of each 
                                                          
19 Id.
20 Id.
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disease among those exposed” with any specificity.21
The responses to the third question—whether a biologically 
plausible mechanism or other evidence supporting a causal 
association existed—expanded the work of the Committee beyond 
epidemiology and engaged the Committee in the review of a broad 
spectrum of studies. The premise of this question is that any 
determination about a causal relationship is strengthened when the 
mechanism of action is understood. For example, researchers 
might find that blood pressure in persons who have taken a certain 
drug is generally lower than in those who have not. If in addition 
researchers determine that this drug relaxes the smooth muscles in 
the arterial walls known to be inversely related to blood pressure 
(muscle contraction increases pressure, but relaxation reduces it), 
then the plausibility of the drug having a causal effect (in this case 
a protective one) is enhanced. The data used in evaluating biologic 
plausibility may derive from a wide range of scientific fields, 
including toxicokinetics, which examines how and at what rate 
compounds are absorbed into the body, distributed to different 
organs, chemically metabolized, and excreted; whole animal 
toxicology, which addresses the pathologic and homeostatic 
responses of the organism, often in rodents but also in other 
species, including humans; and molecular and cellular biology, 
which seeks to understand the biochemical alterations that result 
from an exposure and the subsequent consequences for cell 
functioning. Thus, biologic evidence from experimental studies in 
humans, other animals, and test systems such as cell cultures is 
used to determine whether a plausible mechanism exists. Such 
evidence is considered to provide support for inferring causation 
when statistical associations have been observed in human studies. 
In evaluating the evidence pertaining to its congressional 
mandate, the Committee made decisions regarding the relationship 
between Agent Orange exposure and dozens of health outcomes. 
Four of these will be reviewed in detail: (a) non-Hodgkin’s 
lymphoma, (b) Type II diabetes, (c) prostate cancer, and (d) the 
                                                          
21 The term “risk” will be further defined later in this article but, for now, it 
shall suffice to say that, in the judgment of the Committee, the number of cases 
of each disease among Vietnam veterans due to herbicide exposure could not be 
estimated with any reasonable accuracy. 
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presumptive period for respiratory cancer. The first three are health 
outcomes, while the final one is an issue of timing and causation. 
The Committee concluded that the evidence for an association with 
non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma was sufficient and that biologic 
plausibility was established. For Type II diabetes and for prostate 
cancer, the Committee concluded that there was limited but 
suggestive evidence for an association. The VA had ruled that 
respiratory cancer could be considered service-related only if it 
manifested within a period of thirty years after the end of service in 
Vietnam, termed the “presumptive period.” Charged with 
determining whether this presumptive period had a scientific basis, 
the Committee concluded that it did not. To provide the reader 
with a background for understanding how the Committee reached 
each of these conclusions, this article now turns to an exposition of 
key concepts in scientific and epidemiologic research. 
II. CAUSAL EFFECTS
The concept of causation is fundamental to scientific inquiry, 
which seeks to understand cause and effect relationships of 
physical, chemical, or biological phenomena. Within biomedical 
sciences, potential causes of disease and developmental disorders 
are studied using a variety of tools, including epidemiology and 
toxicology. In these fields, however, the concept of “cause” differs 
from that which courts use in settling individual or even class 
action cases. 
To study the causal effects of an exposure, two identical 
“units” must be compared, one exposed and one unexposed. A unit 
might be, among other things, a person, a laboratory animal, a cell, 
or a piece of tissue. In order for the study to produce results about 
causal effects, it is essential that the two studied units be absolutely 
identical, which is to say that they differ only with regard to the 
exposure. Each unit is evaluated for some response, such as 
growth, chemical or electrical activity, or structural or functional 
change. The difference in response between the exposed unit and 
the unexposed unit represents the “causal effect.” 
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Studies can be classified in many ways, but one significant 
distinction is between experimental and observational studies. 
Table 1 compares these two types of studies: 
Table 1
Experiment Observational Study 
Identical units, such as a single 
strain of laboratory mice 
Units not identical 
Scientist manipulates exposure 
and determines which units are 
or are not exposed 
Exposure occurs beyond the 
control of the scientist 
Scientist determines (measures) 
exposure levels 
Scientist measures exposure 
(measurements may be subject 
to greater error than in 
experiment)  
Outcome is measured: 
reliability will vary with the 
nature of the outcome and the 
quality of the protocol for its 
measurement 
Outcome is measured: 
reliability will vary with the 
nature of the outcome and the 
quality of the protocol for its 
measurement 
Notably, it is easier to ensure the use of identical “units” in an 
experimental study than in an observational study. However, the 
more fundamental difference is that, in an experimental study, the 
exposure is controlled by the investigator; that is, the investigator 
decides which unit will receive the exposure and which will not. 
Typically, this decision is made randomly and either of the units 
could be the chance recipient of the exposure. The investigator also 
determines the level of exposure each unit receives and may assign 
the units to different amounts or intensities of exposure. In an 
observational study, by contrast, exposure is not assigned, but 
rather, occurs for reasons that have nothing to do with any 
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researcher’s actions. Historical, social, political, and physical 
forces, as well as individual choices that may also be shaped by 
any of the above factors, will determine when and where exposure 
occurs. As a result, the exposed unit is rarely identical to the 
unexposed unit. For this reason, the concept of causation in 
observational studies has been more elusive than in experimental 
studies.22
Recently however, a conceptual paradigm has been developed 
that aids in the understanding of the conditions under which causal 
inferences can be made from observational investigations.23 The 
underlying concept is the “counterfactual” that contrasts two 
scenarios. Under the first scenario, the individual unit (usually a 
person, but also possibly a non-laboratory animal) is exposed and 
its response is measured.24 Under scenario two, we suppose that 
the individual is not exposed and, therefore, we can measure the 
response that would have occurred had the individual, counter to 
fact, not been exposed. We call this the counterfactual response. 
Thus, the individual causal effect in an observational setting is the 
difference between the actual and the counterfactual response. 
Unfortunately, the individual causal effect can never be known 
since researchers can never observe both the factual and 
counterfactual experience. Epidemiologists, however, strive to 
measure the group-level causal effect, which represents a type of 
average of the individual-level effects, under the assumption that 
the two groups (exposed and unexposed) each represent the 
counterfactual experience, on average, of the other. In order to do 
so, epidemiologists must first define the following terms: risk (R), 
                                                          
22 It should be noted that even in double-blind, placebo-controlled trials, 
inferring general causation can be problematic, due largely to the fact that 
persons who participate in these studies and who are compliant with the 
treatment regimes are often a select group. Additionally, despite randomization, 
the exposed and unexposed may differ in unmeasured ways, by chance, 
particularly in small trials. Randomization reduces the likelihood of confounding 
but does not eliminate it. See infra Part III. 
23 See Donald B. Rubin & Roderick J. Little, Causal Effects in Clinical and 
Epidemiological Studies Via Potential Outcomes: Concepts and Analytical 
Approaches, 21 ANN. REV. PUBLIC HEALTH 121 (2000). 
24 A response might be a continuous measurement such as blood pressure, 
or a binary outcome, such as the presence or absence of disease. 
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risk factor (RF), risk difference (RD), and risk ratio (RR). Risk is 
defined as the probability of disease, while risk factor refers to an 
exposure or characteristic that increases risk or serves as a 
surrogate for a factor that increases risk. Risk difference is 
calculated by subtracting the “risk if exposed” value from the “risk 
if unexposed” value. Finally, the risk ratio, also known as relative 
risk, is defined as “risk if exposed” divided by “risk if unexposed.”
The importance of the counterfactual assumption cannot be 
overemphasized. In any study, it is possible to make 
measurements. In many studies, the risk difference or risk ratio can 
be measured. However, defining these terms or measuring them 
does not in itself make them meaningful in terms of causation. 
Epidemiologists and other scientists often say that, “association 
does not necessarily imply causation.” One can gain additional 
insight into the source of various conditions and diseases through 
the use of the sufficient causes model. Figure 1 provides an 
example of the application of this paradigm: 
Figure 1 
R
PQ
T
B: Two causes are 
required and sufficient 
S
P U
V
A: Single cause is 
sufficient (rare
situation)
C: Multiple causes are 
required (common 
situation)
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Each circle, or pie, represents a set of sufficient causes.25 In 
circle A, a single cause will result in the disease. This cause might 
be, for example, the measles virus. The virus alone causes the 
clinical entity we call measles. In circle B, a second factor is 
needed; this example might apply if not all individuals exposed to 
the virus actually exhibited the clinical symptoms of the disease, 
that is, if some individuals lacked susceptibility to the virus. Thus, 
in circle B, P is the virus, but R is also necessary because neither P 
alone nor R alone results in the disease. In circle C, five factors are 
necessary to cause disease. This type of scenario corresponds to 
most chronic, or non-infectious, diseases, for which multiple 
factors are likely to play a role in any individual case. By way of 
example, it has been suggested that there may be more than ten 
genes for autism.26 However, each child with autism probably does 
not require all such genes to develop this disorder, and there may 
be several environmental factors also involved. Note also that for 
any given disease there may be several different sets of sufficient 
causes; some individuals will require one set and others will 
require a different, though possibly overlapping, set. For example, 
among workers who smoke and are exposed to arsenic at their 
workplace, some might develop respiratory cancer from the 
cigarette smoke alone, while others might develop cancer from the 
arsenic alone, and still others might develop respiratory cancer 
only because they received both exposures.27
The sufficient causes model is also instructive in terms of 
inferring individual causes. Knowledge about the presence or 
absence of other known risk factors changes the probability that a 
suspect risk factor was causal for an individual case. If an 
individual who has never smoked, whose parents never smoked, 
and who is not married to a smoker develops lung cancer, the 
probability that this cancer was caused by some other known lung 
                                                          
25 MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 8-12 (Kenneth J. Rothman & Sander Greenland 
eds., 1998). 
26 Sarah J. Spence, The Genetics of Autism, 11 SEMINAR PEDIATRIC 
NEUROLOGY 196, 198 (2004). 
27 Irva Hertz-Picciotto et al., Synergism Between Occupational Arsenic 
Exposure and Smoking in Lung Cancer Induction, 3 EPIDEMIOLOGY 23, 28 
(1992). 
20313_blp_13-2 Sheet No. 38 Side B      06/23/2005   10:19:08
20313_blp_13-2 Sheet No. 38 Side B      06/23/2005   10:19:08
C M
Y K
HERTZ MACROED 051905.DOC 5/23/2005 7:48 PM
568 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
carcinogen is increased. If, for instance, that individual is known to 
have high exposure to radon, the likelihood that the radon caused 
the cancer is higher than it would be for another individual with the 
same high exposure to radon who smoked or was exposed 
passively to tobacco smoke. 
III. STUDIES IN GROUPS: ESTIMATION AND PRECISION
Researchers prefer to enroll groups for their studies rather than 
rely on individuals, primarily because individuals almost never 
provide definitive evidence about causal effects. In recognition of 
this limitation, measurements are made on an enrolled group with 
the idea that the results can be extrapolated to the population from 
which the group arose, and hence, to other individuals who were 
not participants in the study. The group that is studied is termed a 
“sample,” and any measure on the sample is considered an 
“estimate” of the parameter (risk ratio, for instance) for the 
complete population. 
For example, researchers concerned that adolescents with 
symptoms of depression may engage in binge drinking of alcohol 
might sample a group of high school students. In the sample, 
researchers may determine what proportion of tenth and eleventh 
graders attending one high school selected at random from all high 
schools in a metropolitan school district exhibit depressive 
symptoms (perhaps by use of a questionnaire). This result provides 
an estimate of the true proportion of high school students with 
depressive symptoms in that school district and perhaps in that 
metropolitan area, that state, the country, or all similar countries. 
If researchers also found out how many of those high school 
students engaged in binge drinking, they could estimate the risk 
ratio for binge drinking by comparing those with depressive 
symptoms to those without such symptoms. The resulting risk ratio 
would be an estimate of the risk ratio in the population. If the risk 
ratio were 1.5, it would mean that high school students in the study 
who had depressive symptoms were one and one-half times more 
likely to engage in binge drinking than those who did not. If the 
risk ratio were 1.0, it would mean that each group of high school 
students had the same risk of engaging in binge drinking. 
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However, epidemiologists recognize that the sample studied 
might be different from or unrepresentative of the complete 
population and thus they also construct a range around this 
estimate. This range is known as a confidence interval and 
represents a range of values that, on average and under certain 
conditions, is expected to include the true population value. The 
width of this interval is roughly a function of the study size, a good 
indication of a more technical quantity known as statistical power. 
In a study in which less than half of the population is exposed and 
disease is not common, this power is mostly determined by the 
number of exposed persons with disease. As the number of 
exposed persons who develop disease increases, the confidence in 
the estimate increases and the interval becomes tighter around the 
estimate. For example, a small study with an RR of 1.5 might have 
a 95% confidence interval of 0.5 to 4.5, in which case we would 
say that the precision is low. A much larger study that also had an 
RR of 1.5 might have a 95% confidence interval of 1.3 to 1.7, 
indicating very high precision. 
The above exposition emphasizes the estimation of effects. The 
precision of these estimates (reflected in confidence intervals) is 
related to another concept used by scientists and invoked in recent 
court decisions regarding admissibility of scientific evidence, 
namely “statistical hypothesis testing.” A common practice in 
many scientific fields is to construct a “null hypothesis,” which 
states that there is no association between the exposure and the 
outcome. Once the study has been conducted, the result is 
compared with the null hypothesis. If the study result is extremely 
different from what is predicted by the “null hypothesis,” then, 
assuming the data are reliable, one may conclude that the null 
hypothesis is not supported because if it were true, then large 
deviations from the null would be improbable. To quantify the 
improbability of the result, one calculates its probability of 
occurring under the dual assumptions of no association and 
complete absence of any other information. The resulting 
probability is called a “p-value.” It is sometimes referred to as an 
“error” rate. 
The merits and misuses of p-values have been the subject of 
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considerable debate within the scientific community.28 One 
criticism of the p-value relates to the convention of using a 
cutpoint of 0.05 to determine whether a finding is “significant” 
(the designation when the p-value is less than 0.05, that is, when 
the probability of the result is less than one in twenty if the null 
hypothesis were true), and declaring all results with p-values above 
0.05 as “nonsignificant.”29 The result of a statistical hypothesis test 
is a decision of whether to “reject” the null hypothesis. In practice, 
it is difficult to argue that results with a p-value of 0.051 are 
qualitatively different from those with a p-value of 0.049. Another 
problem is that the p-value combines two different aspects of the 
study result: the magnitude of the association and its precision. For 
instance, one study may have a p-value of 0.04 when the RR is 8.0; 
this will be a less precise estimate (the confidence interval will be 
wider) than another study with a p-value of 0.04 and an RR of 2.5. 
To address this concern, many epidemiologists have preferred to 
express their results with “estimates” and “confidence limits,” 
thereby keeping these two aspects of the study findings clear and 
separate.
It has also been noted that although a p-value provides 
information about the consistency between the “null hypothesis” 
and the data collected, it provides no information at all about any 
other hypothesis. If one wanted to hypothesize that a risk is 
doubled for individuals who are exposed, one would not calculate 
a p-value. Similarly, if previous studies have already suggested 
that the null hypothesis may not be true, then it may be of greater 
interest to evaluate whether the new data are consistent with the 
previously published findings rather than whether they are 
consistent with a null effect. In fact, p-values do not provide the 
means for placing findings in context,30 or for considering the 
possibility of biases.31 Instead, they are calculated by either 
                                                          
28 One website lists “326 Articles/Books Questioning the Indiscriminate 
Use of Statistical Hypothesis Tests in Observational Studies.” See http://www. 
cnr.colostate.edu/~anderson/thompson1.html.
29 Note that if the 95% confidence interval includes the null value (0 for a 
risk difference, 1 for a risk ratio), then the p-value will be greater than 0.05. 
30 See infra Part V. 
31 See infra Part IV. 
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assuming no other information or by explicitly ignoring it.
Overall, it is unwise to make decisions on the basis of a single 
set of data, a practice that is encouraged by the use of p-values. 
Science does not actually proceed in the manner implied by 
statistical hypothesis testing and, rather than relying on decisions at 
the end of each study, scientists gather and review the body of 
evidence as a whole. It has been suggested that the practice of 
hypothesis testing detracts from scientific thinking; indeed, one 
journal in the field of epidemiology strongly discourages the use of 
p-values to summarize results32 and frequently asks authors to 
remove them as a condition of accepting a paper. 
Further critiques point out that the common use of p<0.05 as a 
criterion for deciding to reject the null hypothesis is based on the 
implicit assumption that there is a high cost to mistakenly rejecting 
the null hypothesis and thereby “finding an association.” In other 
words, this convention presumes that such a conclusion should be 
made only very cautiously (society cannot afford to make this 
mistake more than 5% of the time). In some circumstances, this 
implicit assumption may prove problematic. If the harm from an 
exposure is severe, a regulatory body, for example, may wish to err 
on the side of protecting public health. This, however, would 
require the use of different criteria. In the courtroom, a “more 
likely than not” standard is used in some circumstances as the bar 
against which to evaluate evidence. In a single study (absent any 
other research), a p<0.50 means the probability is less than 50% 
that the data (or more extreme data) arose from a population in 
which exposure and disease are not associated. Hence, a p<0.50 
would be much closer to the criterion of “more likely than not” for 
evaluating whether the data arose from a population in which 
exposure does not cause disease.33
While epidemiologists strive to conduct studies that produce 
precise estimates, there is always the possibility that the estimate 
could be wrong, not because of chance “sampling error” that 
occurs with small or even moderate-sized samples, but because of 
                                                          
32 See Janet M. Lang et al., That Confounded P-Value, 9 EPIDEMIOLOGY 7, 
8 (1998); The Editors, The Value of P, 12 EPIDEMIOLOGY 286 (2001). 
33 I will not presume to guess what probability would correspond to the 
criterion of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
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a more systematic problem known as bias. When bias is present, 
not only is the estimated association incorrect, but the p-value does 
not represent the purported “error rate.” As we shall see, bias is 
usually a greater concern than errors due to random fluctuations 
that produce these error rates in observational studies. 
IV. STUDIES IN GROUPS: BIAS
Bias is present when, on average, the estimates tend to be 
either too high or too low relative to the true population parameter. 
Figure 2 displays how bias can distort a relative risk by creating 
either artificial effects or masking true effects: 
Figure 2: Upward and Downward Bias
The base of the wedge at the start of each arrow is the true 
value of the risk ratio, and the arrowhead is at the biased 
(observed) value. In case 1, an increased risk due to a harmful 
exposure will be presumed to be smaller than it truly is. In case 2, 
an exposure with no effect will be presumed to reduce risk. In case 
3, an exposure that is beneficial (reduces risk) will appear to be 
more beneficial than it really is, whereas in case 4, a beneficial 
exposure will appear as though it has a small harmful effect. In 
case 5, an exposure that has no effect will be presumed to be 
harmful and, in case 6, a slightly harmful exposure will be 
presumed to be more harmful than it is. 
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The main types of epidemiologic bias are selection bias, 
information bias, confounding bias, and statistical bias. Selection 
bias occurs when the subjects in the study sample do not represent 
the targeted population with regard to the exposure and the disease. 
Consider Figure 3, the epidemiologic two-by-two table in which 
each individual falls into one of four cells: exposed with disease, 
exposed without disease, unexposed with disease, or unexposed 
without disease. A completely representative sample will take 
approximately the same proportion from the population out of each 
of the four cells. (This means that if 90% of the population is in the 
cell for unexposed without disease, then 90% of the sample also 
would be from that cell.) It is also possible to intentionally sample 
at a different rate from one column or one row and still obtain an 
unbiased estimate, but only if the investigator ensures that both 
cells in that row or column are sampled in the same proportion. 
No effect 
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
1 2 3 4
Cases 1-3 show “downward” bias, and 
cases 4-6 show “upward” bias. 
5 6
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Figure 3: The Two-by-Two Table
More concretely, suppose that a study is conducted to examine 
the hypothesis that the use of hot tubs by pregnant women 
increases the risk of spontaneous abortion. Suppose further that 
women who use hot tubs are more likely to participate in the study 
because they have more leisure time and that women who have 
spontaneous abortions are also more likely to participate because 
they are concerned about why they lost their pregnancies. In 
essence, a larger percentage of the population in the upper left cell 
of the epidemiologic two-by-two table participated in the study 
than the population percentage in the other cells. In other words, 
proportionately fewer women who did not use a hot tub or who did 
not spontaneously abort would participate in the study.34 This 
would lead to an upward bias in the estimated RR. Thus, if, for the 
sake of argument, the true risk ratio for spontaneous abortion from 
hot tub use were 1.2, in this study we might see an estimated risk 
ratio of 1.5.35 If the true risk ratio were 1.0, we might, for example, 
                                                          
34 This point was made in a commentary by Irva Hertz-Picciotto & 
Penelope P. Howards, Invited Commentary: Hot Tubs and Miscarriage: 
Methodological & Substantive Reasons Why the Case Is Weak, 158 AM. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 938 (2003) (critiquing Li De-Kun et al., Hot Tub Use during 
Pregnancy and the Risk of Miscarriage, 158 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 931 (2003)). 
35 See case 6 in Figure 2. 
 Exposed: Unexposed:
Diseased: Exposed with
disease
Unexposed with 
disease
Total diseased 
Not diseased: Exposed without 
disease
Unexposed without 
disease
Total without 
disease
Total exposed Total unexposed Grand Total 
20313_blp_13-2 Sheet No. 42 Side A      06/23/2005   10:19:08
20313_blp_13-2 Sheet No. 42 Side A      06/23/2005   10:19:08
C M
Y K
HERTZ MACROED 051905.DOC 5/23/2005 7:48 PM
 HEALTH EFFECTS OF AGENT ORANGE 575 
observe a risk ratio of 1.2 or greater.36
In other examples, the bias might occur in the opposite 
direction. For instance, researchers who studied high fat diets and 
diabetes might find that persons eating high fat diets and diabetics 
would be less likely to participate. In this case, the upper left cell 
in Figure 3 would be underrepresented as compared to the 
population at large. Therefore, if the true RR were 1.8, then one 
might observe an RR of, say, 1.2;37 alternately, if the true RR were 
1.0, one might observe a lower RR of, for instance, 0.7.38 In the 
former case, researchers might incorrectly conclude that there is 
only a small detrimental effect of the high fat diet when it is quite 
harmful, and, in the latter case, the study incorrectly suggests a 
protective effect, that is, a lower risk of diabetes among those who 
eat high fat diets. In short, selection bias can lead one to draw the 
wrong conclusion. 
Information bias, by comparison, occurs when information 
about the disease diagnosis differs between those who are exposed 
and those who are unexposed. For example, bias might result 
where individuals of low socioeconomic status who do participate 
are more likely to be exposed than those at higher socioeconomic 
levels, but less likely to be diagnosed because they lack health 
insurance and rarely see a physician. Thus, persons with the 
disease may be misclassified as healthy because they are not yet 
diagnosed. Information bias also might occur when data on 
exposure differs with regard to those who have the disease and 
those who do not. For example, in a study of the possible 
connection between pesticide use around the home and incidence 
of childhood leukemia, parents may be asked to recall what 
pesticide products they used and when. The parents of affected 
children might be more likely to recall every insecticide or 
fungicide used in or around their house than the parents of healthy 
children. This would result in a specific type of information bias 
termed reporting bias or recall bias, which usually results in 
upward bias. 
                                                          
36 See case 5 in Figure 2. 
37 See case 1 in Figure 2. 
38 See case 2 in Figure 2. 
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Another type of bias, confounding bias, occurs when an 
alternative risk factor for the disease (one that is not the exposure 
of interest for the study) happens to occur more or less frequently 
in the exposed as compared with the unexposed. Consider, for 
example, a study to examine the hypothesis that exposure to 
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) during infancy adversely affects 
the cognitive development of children. Suppose that a major source 
of PCBs to infants is breast milk. Then suppose that mothers who 
breastfeed their infants are more educated and are more likely to 
read to their children or offer other intellectual stimulation. Notice 
that an experiment to test the hypothesis that PCBs adversely affect 
cognitive development would randomly assign some mothers to 
breastfeed and others to give formula. However, in the real world, 
women who choose to breastfeed are not the same as those who do 
not elect to breastfeed and hence cannot serve as the 
“counterfactual” experience for those who do not breastfeed. The 
result is confounding bias: children with a higher exposure to 
PCBs were given greater intellectual stimulation. In this example, 
the RR would be biased downward, but it is possible that in other 
examples the RR could be biased upward. 
A fourth type of bias is statistical bias. Statistical bias occurs as 
a result of errors in statistical analysis or limitations in data. 
Sometimes the methods used for analysis do not match the 
conditions in which the data were collected or the variables as 
defined by the investigator; hence, bias results. In other instances, 
the adjustment for confounders is done incorrectly, and bias is 
introduced inadvertently. Thus, to avoid statistical bias, 
epidemiologists, in addition to having an intimate understanding of 
the subject they are studying, must be knowledgeable about both 
statistical methods and proper confounder selection strategies. 
It is important to keep in mind that all of these types of bias 
could be in either the positive (upward) or negative (downward) 
direction. However, one cannot dismiss the results of a study 
simply because there is a possibility of bias or confounding. 
Frequently, one can glean information that bears on the direction 
of bias. For example, if the factors tending toward downward bias 
are stronger than those that would magnify the association between 
exposure and disease, one would expect the true relationship to be 
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stronger than the one observed in the study. 
This discussion about bias and precision can now be used to 
answer the problem of how to measure causal effects in groups. 
The key is that when certain conditions or requirements are met, 
the association between exposure and disease may be interpreted 
as a causal one or at least one can conclude that such an inference 
probably does not stray far from the truth. These conditions and 
requirements may be satisfied when (a) study subjects have been 
properly sampled and recruited;39 (b) exposures and disease have 
been measured or diagnosed accurately;40 (c) confounder data are 
complete and adequately measured; and (d) the appropriate 
multivariable statistical techniques have been used to analyze the 
data. Under these conditions, once all confounders have been 
accounted for, the unexposed group provides a good representation 
of the counterfactual experience of the exposed group and the 
analysis properly compares the group responses. 
In other words, as long as the quality of data is reliable and the 
analysis is statistically correct and appropriately takes account of 
confounders, then the two groups (exposed and unexposed) can be 
validly compared. In this scenario, one can infer that the study RD 
or RR will be a measure of the causal effect of exposure. Of 
course, this measured causal effect may or may not be a precise 
estimate, as that will depend on whether the study has an adequate-
sized sample. The quality of an individual study, therefore, 
depends on there being (1) minimum bias, which is achieved 
through careful design, sound methods of data collection and 
measurement of exposures and disease, and appropriate statistical 
treatment of the data; and (2) an adequate-sized study sample. 
V. REACHING CONSENSUS
In practice, epidemiologic studies are never perfect, and even 
the best studies only approximately meet the necessary conditions 
for risk ratios or risk differences to be interpreted as causal effects. 
For this reason, it is nearly always true that causation cannot be 
                                                          
39 This ensures a low probability of selection bias. 
40 This acts to reduce information bias. 
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inferred from a single study, but rather, must be examined in a 
multitude of studies. The problem is less acute when experimental 
(randomized) studies are possible, such as for the evaluation of 
drugs that are believed to impart a benefit to those taking them. In 
this situation, the evaluation of evidence is more straightforward 
than it would be for exposures for which it would be unethical to 
conduct such research (such as cigarette smoking or asbestos 
exposure). It is these latter, allegedly harmful exposures that have 
generated discussion about how to infer causation. This discussion 
has focused on how epidemiologists should evaluate a body of 
evidence from multiple studies, including human epidemiologic 
investigations, experimental data from whole animals, and 
mechanistic research in which cells or tissues are manipulated to 
understand physiologic or biochemical processes believed to be 
related to pathogenesis in the human body. 
As the body of evidence grows and new hypotheses are 
proposed, the research community begins the process of reaching 
consensus regarding which studies and ideas it finds convincing. 
Arriving at a consensus can take months, years, or decades. For 
example, consensus regarding the role of the human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) in AIDS took a relatively short 
time, whereas the environmental contribution to breast cancer still 
remains contentious. 
Consensus does not require and is not synonymous with 
unanimity. Even today it is possible to find some who are 
unconvinced about the relationship between HIV and AIDS or 
between smoking and lung cancer. That being said, the reaching of 
consensus often follows a typical pattern, in which evidence 
accrues and scientific opinion shifts. For example, consider a study 
that finds a previously unstudied association in which exposure E 
is related to an increased risk of disease D. To receive attention, 
the study often would have observed a strong association. 
Frequently, these first findings are based on a small sample size. 
Some scientists may reject these findings because they object to 
the study’s methodology. Other researchers will then attempt to 
replicate the finding using improved methodology and maybe 
larger study samples, but it is possible that only some of the studies 
will confirm the original result. Over time, the weight of the 
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evidence will tend to fall on one side or the other. At some point, a 
meta-analysis or “quantitative review,” which is a combined 
analysis of multiple studies, will be conducted. For this, it is 
preferable to use high quality studies as this type of analysis is 
more effective in addressing the precision of results than the 
biases. Meanwhile, toxicologic or other basic science studies may 
or may not demonstrate a plausible mechanism. Thus, the 
consensus will build either in support or in contradiction of a 
causal effect. 
Although ideally scientists will evaluate evidence in a value-
free context, it is increasingly recognized that it is impossible for 
scientists to be totally “objective” because individuals are 
unavoidably influenced by their particular cultures and personal 
experiences. Studies have documented how these experiences 
influence the way in which individuals assess scientific studies and 
place greater weight on certain studies or lines of evidence as 
compared with others. It should be noted that the IOM, in 
assembling its committees, consciously seeks to achieve not only 
diversity of fields of expertise, but also “balance” among possible 
biases on its committees. 
Although criteria have existed for inferences about microbial 
causes of infections for more than a century, the discussion about 
causal inference for chronic diseases is more recent. In the 1960s, 
the debate as to whether cigarette smoking causes lung cancer 
provided the impetus for the development of a specific set of 
guidelines for inferring causality. These were summarized by Sir 
Bradford Hill41 and include the following primary considerations: 
1. Temporality: A cause must precede an effect. 
2. Strength of Association: A high RR or RD provides 
greater weight than a low one. 
3. Coherence: Evidence from other fields should support, 
not contradict, the causal hypothesis. 
4. Biologic Plausibility: Known biologic facts should 
support, not contradict, the proposed causal effect. 
                                                          
41 Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or 
Causation?, 58 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 295 (1965). 
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5. Consistency: Multiple studies using different designs 
and/or different populations should confirm the finding. 
6. Dose-response: The greater the exposure, the greater 
should be the likelihood of a response. 
7. Specificity: The outcome should be less frequent in the 
absence of exposure or after removal of the exposure. 
These considerations are not formal criteria and Hill himself 
cautioned against using them as such, although such misuse is 
often found in the scientific literature.42 Moreover, it can be shown 
that failure to observe several of these facets of an association does 
not necessarily detract from the conclusion of causality. In fact, it 
has been argued that only temporality is truly required.43
VI. THE IOM COMMITTEE AND ITS EVALUATION OF SPECIFIC
OUTCOMES FOR VIETNAM VETERANS
Applying the epidemiological principles discussed earlier in 
this article, this section reviews the evidence and reasoning behind 
the decisions reached by the Committee with regard to non-
Hodgkin’s lymphoma, Type II diabetes, prostate cancer, and the 
presumptive period for respiratory cancer. 
In the case of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, the first Committee, 
which completed its review in 1994, concluded that the evidence 
was sufficient regarding an association with herbicides or their 
contaminants.44 A sizable number of studies in occupational 
cohorts had been conducted, and although many showed either no 
association (RR=1.0) or very slight associations, quite a few 
                                                          
42 See, e.g., Carl V. Phillips & Karen J. Goodman, The Missed Lessons of 
Sir Austin Bradford Hill, 1 EPIDEMIOLOGIC PERSPECTIVES & INNOVATIONS 3 
(2004), available at http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/pdf/1742-5573-1-
3.pdf. These considerations have now spilled over into the courts as well. See 
Joe G. Hollingsworth & Eric G. Lasker, The Case Against Differential 
Diagnosis: Daubert, Medical Causation Testimony, and the Scientific Method,
37 J. HEALTH L. 85 (2004). 
43 Mervyn Susser, Falsification, Verification, and Causal Inference in 
Epidemiology: Reconsiderations in the Light of Sir Karl Popper’s Philosophy,
in CAUSAL INFERENCE (Kenneth J. Rothman ed., 1988). 
44 See VAO 1994, supra note 5. 
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studies showed an elevated risk of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. 
These included studies of Swedish workers who were exposed to 
phenoxy herbicides;45 forest conservationists who worked for the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (RR=2.5, 95% CI=1.0 to 6.3);46
farmers in Kansas who had used herbicides for more than twenty 
days per year (RR=6.0, 95% CI=1.9 to 19.5);47 Canadian farmers 
who applied pesticides to more than 250 acres (RR=2.2, 95% 
CI=1.0 to 4.6);48 Washington State forestry herbicide appliers 
(RR=4.8, 95% CI=1.2 to 19.4);49 and Italian farmers licensed to 
use pesticides (RR=1.8, 95% CI=1.2 to 2.5).50 In addition to these 
studies of occupational exposures, non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma was 
increased among male residents of Italian provinces in 
contaminated areas (RR=2.2, 95% CI=1.4 to 3.5),51 and in a 
Finnish community in which the water supply was contaminated 
with chlorophenols (RR=2.8, with a 95% CI=1.4 to 5.6).52 Also, 
unlike many of the other health outcomes examined, non-
Hodgkin’s lymphoma was observed at a higher rate in Vietnam 
                                                          
45 See Bodil Persson et al., Malignant Lymphomas and Occupational 
Exposures, 46 BR. J. IND. MED. 516 (1989); Lennart Hardell, Malignant 
Lymphoma and Exposure to Chemical Substances, in Particular Organic 
Solvents, Chlorphenol and Phenoxyacetates, 77 LAKARTIDNINGEN 208 (1980). 
46 See Michael C. Alavanja et al., Mortality Among Forest and Soil 
Conservationists, 44 ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH 94 (1989). 
47 See Shelia Hoar et al., Agricultural Herbicide Use and Risk of 
Lymphoma and Soft-Tissue Sarcoma, 256 JAMA 1141 (1986), erratum, 256 
JAMA 3351 (1986). 
48 See Donald T. Wigle et al., Mortality Study of Canadian Male Farm 
Operators: Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma Mortality and Agricultural Practices in 
Saskatchewan, 82 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 575, 579 Tbl.7 (1990). 
49 See James S. Woods & L. Polissar, Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma among 
Phenoxy Herbicide-Exposed Farmworkers in Western Washington State, 18 
CHEMOSPHERE 401 (1987). 
50 See G. Corrao et al., Cancer Risk in a Cohort of Licensed Pesticide 
Users, 15 SCANDINAVIAN J. WORK, ENV’T & HEALTH 203 (1989). 
51 Paolo Vineis et al., Incidence Rates of Lymphomas and Soft-Tissue 
Sarcomas and Environmental Measurements of Phenoxy Herbicides, 83 J.
NAT’L CANCER INST. 362 (1991). 
52 P. Lampi et al., Cancer Incidence Following Chlorophenol Exposure in a 
Community in Southern Finland, 47 ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH 167, 171 Tbl.5 
(1992). 
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veterans than in the general population. As of the review 
conducted by the first IOM Committee, an excess of non-
Hodgkin’s lymphoma cases had been observed in several studies 
of U.S. Navy personnel (RR =2.2, 95% CI=1.2 to 3.9),53 or Marine 
personnel (RR=2.1, 95% CI=1.2 to 3.854 and RR=3.2 95% CI =1.4 
to 7.455).
In total, more than two dozen studies showed some indication 
of excess mortality or incidence from non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. 
Not all of these studies were of the highest quality and there were 
some studies that showed no excess risk, that is, no significant 
departures from the expected level of risk. Although many of the 
studies cited above adjusted for potential confounders, such 
variables could have created the appearance of an association 
(increased the estimated RR) or could have obscured an 
association (reduced the estimated RR). In some of the studies, the 
definition of exposure was extremely broad and probably included 
a high proportion of individuals who were not exposed to any of 
the herbicides that were used in Vietnam, resulting in “information 
bias.” In such circumstances, it would be easy to underestimate the 
effect of an exposure. In light of what might be an expected 
“downward” bias, the replication across quite a number of 
investigations that had an adequate sample size was impressive. 
Neither the Seveso cohort56 nor the chemical production 
workers57 experienced increased risks for non-Hodgkin’s 
                                                          
53 The Selected Cancers Cooperative Study Group, The Association of 
Selected Cancers with Service in the U.S. Military in Vietnam III, Centers for 
Disease Control, Hodgkin’s Disease, Nasal Cancer, Nasopharyngeal Cancer, 
and Primary Liver Cancer, 150 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2495 (1990). 
54 Patricia Breslin et al., Proportionate Mortality Study of U.S. Army and 
U.S. Marine Corps Veterans of the Vietnam War, 30 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED.
412, 416 Tbl.6 (1988).
55 PATRICIA BRESLIN ET AL., VETERAN’S ADMINISTRATION, NON-
HODGKIN’S LYMPHOMA AMONG VIETNAM VETERANS (1987). 
56 See Pier Alberto Bertazzi et al., Ten-Year Mortality Study of the 
Population Involved in the Seveso Incident in 1976, 129 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY
1187 (1989); Angela C. Pesatori et al., Cancer Morbidity in the Seveso Area, 
1976-1986, 25 CHEMOSPHERE 209 (1992). 
57 Fingerhut et al., supra note 12, at 216; Andreas Zober et al., Thirty-Four-
Year Mortality Follow-Up of BASF Employees Exposed to 2,3,7,8-TCDD after 
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lymphoma. As these groups were most heavily exposed to 2,3,7,8-
TCDD, with little or no exposure to the herbicides in Agent 
Orange, the epidemiologic data tended to suggest that the 
associations were more likely due to 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T. However, 
the Committee did not attempt to make the case that these 
compounds were the causal agents. 
Biologic plausibility that Agent Orange was capable of 
producing this type of cancer was supported by a study that 
produced lymphoma in female mice after the administration of 
2,3,7,8-TCDD.58 However, the Committee noted that the 
herbicides contained in Agent Orange, including 2,4-D, 2,4,5-T, 
picloram, and cacodylic acid, had been inadequately tested in 
animals. 
The conclusion of sufficient evidence drew on a set of studies 
that showed fair consistency. While not all studies could 
definitively exclude bias or confounding, it was unlikely that all of 
the studies were biased in the same direction. Moreover, in several 
investigations, the groups with the best-documented or highest 
probability of exposure showed the greatest increase in risk. Later 
studies confirmed the findings of excess risk for non-Hodgkin’s 
lymphoma in yet other populations.59
Type II diabetes and prostate cancer are both characterized as 
                                                          
the 1953 Accident, 62 INST. ARCH. OCCUPATIONAL ENVT’L HEALTH 139 (1990); 
Alfred Manz et al., Cancer Mortality among Workers in Chemical Plant 
Contaminated with Dioxin, 338 LANCET 959 (1991). 
58 See James Huff et al., Long-Term Carcinogenesis Studies on 2,3,7,8-
tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin and Hexachlorodibenzo-p-dioxins, 7 CELL 
BIOLOGY AND TOXICOLOGY 67 (1991). 
59 See, e.g., COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE HEALTH EFFECTS IN VIETNAM 
VETERANS OF EXPOSURE TO HERBICIDES, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE 
NATIONAL ACADEMIES, VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE: UPDATE 1996 (1996) 
[hereinafter VAO UPDATE 1996]; COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE HEALTH EFFECTS 
IN VIETNAM VETERANS OF EXPOSURE TO HERBICIDES, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE 
OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE: UPDATE 1998
(1999) [hereinafter VAO UPDATE 1998]; COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE HEALTH 
EFFECTS IN VIETNAM VETERANS OF EXPOSURE TO HERBICIDES, INSTITUTE OF 
MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE:
UPDATE 2000 (2001) [hereinafter VAO UPDATE 2000]; VAO UPDATE 2002, 
supra note 8.
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having “limited/suggestive” evidence of an association. For Type 
II diabetes, data were considered inadequate at the time the first 
three Committees evaluated the evidence. (The first two 
Committees considered the broader grouping of metabolic 
disorders as a whole, largely because little research had been 
published relating diabetes to the herbicides used in Vietnam or 
their contaminants.) Nevertheless, the third Committee, which 
published its findings in Update 1998, noted that a number of 
reports, including one on the Ranch Hand personnel, showed 
altered glucose metabolism. The Update reported, “Further 
analyses and full publication of existing studies may justify a 
reevaluation of this conclusion.”60 A flurry of papers appeared 
between 1996 and 2000 suggesting some association with 2,3,7,8-
TCDD (“dioxin”).61 As a result, the fourth Committee, which 
published its result in 2000, determined that the evidence was 
limited, but suggestive of an association with exposures incurred in 
Vietnam. Among residents exposed to dioxin because of the 
industrial accident in Seveso, deaths from diabetes occurred at a 
higher rate than in the reference population that was not exposed, 
particularly among females.62 Excess mortality from diabetes was 
                                                          
 60 VAO UPDATE 1998, supra note 59, at 11.
61 See, e.g., Geoffrey M. Calvert et al., Evaluation of Diabetes Mellitus, 
Serum Glucose, and Thyroid Function among United States Workers Exposed to 
2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin, 56 OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 270 
(1999); Gary L. Henriksen et al., Serum Dioxin and Diabetes Mellitus in 
Veterans of Operation Ranch Hand, 8 EPIDEMIOLOGY 252 (1997); Angela C. 
Pesatori et al., Dioxin Exposure and Non-Malignant Health Effects: A Mortality 
Study, 55 OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 126 (1998); John Vena et al., 
Exposure to Dioxin and Nonneoplastic Mortality in the Expanded IARC 
International Cohort Study of Phenoxy Herbicide and Chlorophenol Production 
Workers and Sprayers, 106 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 645 (Supp. 2 1998), 
available at http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/members/1998/Suppl-2/645-653vena/vena. 
html; COMMONWEALTH DEP’T OF VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, MORBIDITY OF VIETNAM 
VETERANS: A STUDY OF THE HEALTH OF AUSTRALIA’S VIETNAM VETERAN 
COMMUNITY, VOLUME 1: MALE VIETNAM VETERANS SURVEY AND COMMUNITY 
COMPARISON OUTCOMES (1998) [hereinafter COMMONWEALTH STUDY]; Morris 
F. Cranmer et al., Exposure to 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD) is 
Associated with Hyperinsulinemia and Insulin Resistance, 56 TOXICOLOGICAL 
SCIENCES 431, 433 (2000).
62 See Pier A. Bertazzi et al., The Seveso Studies on Early and Long-Term 
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observed in a multinational European cohort of chemical 
production workers,63 although the excess was not statistically 
significant. No excess was observed by Steenland et al., who 
studied the U.S. cohort of chemical workers assembled by 
NIOSH.64
Typically, Type II diabetes is not fatal and is often not listed on 
a death certificate, even if one of its complications is the cause of 
death. For this reason, studies of mortality from diabetes would be 
limited in their ability to detect associations with exposures. By 
comparison, diagnoses among the living might provide a more 
complete ascertainment of cases, and hence, studies on morbidity 
would be considered more definitive. In one such study, self-
reports of diabetes were substantially higher than expected in 
Australian veterans who served in Vietnam.65 Among Air Force 
personnel who participated in the “Ranch Hand” study, glucose 
abnormalities and use of oral medications for diabetes were 
elevated.66 Additionally, higher blood serum concentrations of 
2,3,7,8-TCDD were associated with an elevated incidence of Type 
II diabetes.67 Table 2 shows the risk ratios for men whose blood 
serum TCDD was in the three upper quartiles as compared with 
those whose blood serum TCDD was in the lowest quartile. The 
data do not show a perfect trend of increasing risk, but the upper 
two quartiles seem to be at higher risk than the lower two. 
                                                          
Effects of Dioxin Exposure: A Review, 106 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 625 
(Supp. 2 1998), available at http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/members/1998/Suppl-2/ 
625-633bertazzi/bertazzi.html. 
63 See Vena et al., supra note 60. 
64 See Kyle Steenland et al., Cancer, Heart Disease, and Diabetes in 
Workers Exposed to 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin, 91 J. NAT’L CANCER
INST. 779, 785 (1999). 
65 See COMMONWEALTH STUDY, supra note 60. 
66 See Henriksen et al., supra note 60. 
67 See Matthew P. Longnecker et al., Serum Dioxin Level in Relation to 
Diabetes Mellitus among Air Force Veterans with Background Levels of 
Exposure, 11 EPIDEMIOLOGY 44 (2000). 
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Table 2: Incidence of Type II diabetes among Air Force 
Ranch Hand personnel according to blood serum 
concentration of dioxin, in quartiles. 
Serum dioxin 
concentration:
1st quartile 
(lowest ) 
2nd quartile  3rd quartile  4th quartile 
 (highest) 
Risk ratio* 1 0.9 1.9 1.7
95% confidence 
interval
-- (0.5, 1.6) (1.1, 3.2) (1.0, 2.9) 
*adjusted for family history, age, race, and military occupation 
The confidence intervals (CIs) indicate that the data are 
consistent with anywhere between a rather small increased risk 
(RR just slightly above 1.0) and a fairly substantial one (a nearly 
three-fold higher risk). This study is notable in that the designation 
of diabetes was based on a clinical examination, not self-reporting. 
Additionally, a study conducted among residents near a hazardous 
waste site with dioxin contamination showed elevated risks for 
“high” fasting insulin if their serum TCDD concentration was 
elevated.68 In general, the conclusion that the data showed 
limited/suggestive evidence of association was based on both the 
mortality and morbidity studies, with emphasis on the latter. The 
fact that some of these associations occurred in Vietnam veterans 
also weighed into the Committee’s deliberations. Nevertheless, 
because many of the studies relied on self-reported illness, 
therefore raising the possibility of bias, the evidence fell far short 
of being sufficient. 
A large number of studies have addressed the risk for prostate 
                                                          
68 See Cranmer et al., supra note 60, at 431-33. 
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cancer.69 Evaluation of this health outcome is difficult for several 
reasons. First, it is very common among elderly men, and second, 
most of the risk ratios are small (approximately 1.2). This is likely 
to occur when an outcome has multiple causes because no single 
cause is responsible for a high proportion of cases. Another factor 
to consider is the question of incidence versus mortality. Mortality 
is influenced by the aggressiveness of a tumor, but also by several 
other factors, including the quality of care, the treatment, and the 
stage at which the disease was diagnosed. In turn, these factors are 
affected by such variables as access to care and a patient’s 
socioeconomic status. Thus, even if an exposure increases the 
incidence of prostate cancer, it may not show an association with 
mortality from prostate cancer because so much can intervene to 
alter survival after the occurrence of disease. Some of the early 
evidence used in the Committee’s decision came from a well-
conducted investigation of farmers or herbicide applicators, where 
greater exposures conferred higher risk,70 and a number of 
occupational cohort studies in which risk was increased, but not 
significantly so. Additionally, the exposed population in Seveso 
showed an increased risk of prostate cancer.71 In subsequent 
reviews of the evidence, the trend continued as many studies 
produced slightly elevated risk ratios while a few studies suggested 
a stronger association. 
The Committee has, during updates of the reports, changed the 
classification of some of the health outcomes. For example, as 
mentioned above, diabetes was first classified as having inadequate 
evidence and then categorized as having limited or suggestive 
evidence of an association at the 2000 Update and by a separate 
committee convened to address this question on its own.72
Although it has not happened yet, it is possible that the Committee 
could find the evidence regarding some outcome to be inadequate 
                                                          
69 See, e.g., VAO UPDATE 2002, supra note 8. 
70 See Howard Morrison et al., Farming and Prostate Cancer Mortality,
137 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 270 (1993). 
71 Bertazzi et al., supra note 56. 
72 See VAO UPDATE 2000, supra note 59; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE: HERBICIDE/DIOXIN EXPOSURE AND TYPE 2
DIABETES (2000). 
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after that disease was in the limited or suggestive category if newer 
studies were conducted that tended to show no association and 
were of higher quality than the earlier ones. 
The fourth and final example of how the Committee has 
reviewed evidence concerns respiratory cancer and the 
“presumptive period.” The VA had ruled that respiratory cancer 
could be considered service related only if it manifested within 
thirty years following one’s service in Vietnam.73 This thirty-year 
period was referred to as the “presumptive period.” The Committee 
was asked to determine whether there was a scientific basis for this 
presumptive period. However, based on all of the empirical 
evidence from Vietnam veterans and other exposed populations, 
the question simply could not be answered. The analysis of time 
since the beginning of employment in exposed jobs suggested that 
the elevated risk for respiratory cancer might continue for at least 
the third decade. But this analysis begs the question, how long 
after an exposure ends will risk continue to be increased? Most 
occupational studies had not analyzed the mortality among cohorts 
of workers to determine whether excess risk of respiratory cancer 
changed with time since exposure ended. For the Seveso cohort, an 
insufficient period of time has elapsed to evaluate the thirty-year 
presumptive period (the accident occurred in 1976, fewer than 
thirty years prior to this writing). Thus, given the lack of pertinent 
epidemiologic data, the Committee relied on toxicokinetic data 
about how the chemicals of interest are stored in the body and on 
current understanding of the biology of human cancer. Dioxin is 
known to have a relatively long half-life in human tissues.74 This 
TCDD half-life is estimated at between seven and nine years, but 
this period depends on the amount of fat in the studied individual75
                                                          
73 See Disease Associated with Exposure to Certain Herbicide Agents 
(Multiple Myeloma and Respiratory Cancers), 59 Fed. Reg. 29723-01 (June 9, 
1994) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 3).
74 The half-life is the time it takes for the concentration to decrease to half 
of what it was. 
75 See Dieter Flesch-Janys et al., Elimination of Polychlorinated Dibenzo-p-
dioxins and Dibenzofurans in Occupationally Exposed Persons, 47 J.
TOXICOLOGY ENVTL. HEALTH 363, 377 (1996); Joel E. Michalek & Ram C. 
Tripathi, Pharmacokinetics of TCDD in Veterans of Operation Ranch Hand: 15-
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and may differ between men and women. Hence, after external 
exposure ends, the compound remains in fatty tissue, circulates in 
the blood, and deposits itself in various organs. At any time during 
this period, disease induction can occur even though external 
exposure has ceased. In addition, disease detection may occur long 
after induction.76
Cancer progresses through multiple stages, beginning with 
initiation, the time at which a cell’s DNA is damaged. The 
damaged cell then escapes the surveillance of the body’s repair 
system and the immune system, which usually hunts out damaged 
cells. Other changes, known as promotion, may occur until the cell 
begins to divide unchecked, resulting in proliferation. Further 
stages enable the tumor to develop its own blood supply. 
The point at which diagnosis occurs is determined by biologic, 
social, and individual psychologic factors. Biologic determinants 
will include the aggressiveness of the tumor, age of the person, and 
presence of other medical conditions that might influence 
immunologic competence. The social factors will include access to 
care, the quality of any screening program, and the skill and 
vigilance of the health provider. Individual characteristics that 
influence how early in the disease process a diagnosis is made 
include the propensity to seek medical care, which is highly 
variable in the population and is related to the degree of trust 
placed in the medical profession, and the fear of a diagnosis of 
cancer.
Given the above considerations, the Committee concluded that 
there was no scientific justification for a presumptive period of 
thirty years for respiratory cancer. The possibility that circulating 
TCDD might result in the initiation of cancer decades after a 
veteran’s service in Vietnam had ended could not be excluded. A 
further consideration was the uncertain length of the latency period 
between the initiation of the disease process and the diagnosis. 
                                                          
Year Follow-Up, 57 J. TOXICOLOGY ENVTL. HEALTH 369, 376 (1999). 
76 The period between the start of a disease process and the time it is 
diagnosed is termed the “latent period.” 
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SUMMARY
The IOM Committees were charged with determining whether 
there were associations between health outcomes and herbicides 
used in Vietnam or their contaminants. The IOM Committees 
addressed three questions: whether there was a statistical 
association between the exposures and any health outcomes, what 
magnitude of increased risk Vietnam veterans would be expected 
to experience for each of the health outcomes due to herbicide 
exposures incurred while in Vietnam, and whether evidence 
supported the biologic plausibility of a causal association. To 
answer the first question, the Committees classified the outcomes 
into four categories of evidence (sufficient, limited or suggestive, 
inadequate, or limited evidence of no association) and adopted an 
approach that weighed the body of evidence and took into 
consideration the methodologic rigor of the studies. With regard to 
the second question, that of quantifying the risk to Vietnam 
veterans, the Committee concluded that the increased risk could 
not be identified due to the lack of adequate data quantifying the 
exposures of those who served in Vietnam. To address the third 
question, that is, whether a plausible biologic mechanism exists 
through which the herbicides and their contaminants could cause 
specific health outcomes, the Committee evaluated a wide range of 
data types, including toxicologic studies in humans and 
experimental animals, and research on mechanisms that use tissues 
and cell cultures. 
In reviewing the Committees’ findings, it is important to 
remember that most non-infectious diseases are caused by multiple 
factors and that to determine the effects of exposure, causality is 
defined in an individual, but can only be measured in groups. 
Epidemiologists therefore study groups and, for ethical reasons, 
frequently rely on observational rather than experimental methods. 
The quality of observational studies depends on minimizing the 
four types of bias and maximizing precision by using large sample 
sizes (particularly with regard to the number of exposed cases of 
disease). Statistical significance is a small part of evidence, and the 
use of p-values for causal inference can result in faulty 
conclusions. Single studies can add to or detract from evidence for 
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causality, but ultimately an inference of causality depends on 
replication across studies that provide precise estimates of effects 
and that are relatively free of bias. Accrual of epidemiologic 
evidence over time, along with experimental studies in animals and 
cell or tissue cultures that establish mechanisms, generally leads 
towards a consensus as to whether an exposure causes a health 
outcome, although this process often takes years or longer. The 
evidence about health effects of herbicides used in Vietnam and 
their contaminants was slow to accumulate, partially because a 
concerted effort to study the veterans longitudinally, beginning 
from the time of their return to the United States, was not 
undertaken, and partially because it was technologically difficult to 
study dioxin, as it is present in such small quantities. 
